State Land Use Statutes:  A Comparative Analysis by Loo, Ernest J.T.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 45 Issue 6 Article 4 
1977 
State Land Use Statutes: A Comparative Analysis 
Ernest J.T. Loo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ernest J.T. Loo, State Land Use Statutes: A Comparative Analysis, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 1154 (1977). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol45/iss6/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
STATE LAND USE STATUTES:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
State control of land use and development has grown rapidly in recent
years. Prior to 1965, only one state permitted state-wide regulation of land
development.' Most states, copying the Standard Zoning Enabling Act de-
vised by the U.S. Department of Commerce in the 1920's, had delegated the
power to regulate land use to municipal and county governments. 2 Recently,
however, the recognition that land is a valuable and limited resource, the
concern for environmental protection, and the realization that land develop-
ment often has effects which extend beyond the immediate environs of the
development site have prompted national and state efforts to provide for state
control over land use. 3 As a result, today many states have initiated some
form of regional or state-wide regulation. 4 This trend has been encouraged by
two events. First, Congress has considered several proposals in the last six
years which, if enacted, would provide funding to states to institute systems
1. Hawaii adopted state land use controls in 1961. No other state enacted state-wide
regulations for almost a decade. See Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., State Land Use Programs 75-93 (Comm. Print 1974).
2. All fifty states have adopted legislation based on this model at one time or another. 1 N.
Williams, American Land Planning Law § 18.01 at 355 (1974).
3. See 5 N. Williams, American Land Planning Law § 160.17 (1975).
4. Throughout this Comment the term "regional" is used to mean an intra-state geographical
area. Many states exercise land use controls over selected regions within the state such as
shorelines, tidal areas, and wetlands. E.g., California Coastal Zone Conservation Act, Cal. Pub.
Res. Code §§ 27000-650 (Supp. 1976); New York Tidal Wetlands Act, N.Y. Environmental
Conservation Law §§ 25-0101 to -0602 (McKinney Supp. 1976). For a discussion of selected
regional control statutes see F. Bosselman & D. Callies, The Quiet Revolution in Land Use
Control (1971) [hereinafter cited as Bosselman & Callies]. The states with state-wide controls are:
Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-65-101 to -65.1-502 (1973), as amended, (Supp. 1975);
Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 380.012-. 12 (1974), as amended, (Curi. Supp. 1976); Hawaii, Hawaii
Rev. Stat. §§ 205-1 to -16.2 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1975); Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
38, §§ 481-89 (Cum. Supp. 1973), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1976) and Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. fit.
12, §§ 681 to 685-C, 689 (1974), as amended, (Curi. Supp. 1976); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann.
§§ 116G.01-. 14 (Cure. Supp. 1976); Montana, Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 84-7501 to -7526 (Cure.
Supp. 1975); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 321.640-.810 (1975); Oregon, Ore. Rev. Stat.
§§ 197.005-.795 (1975); Utah, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-28-1 (Supp. 1975); Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 10, §§ 6001-91 (1973), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1976); and Wyoming, Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§§ 9-849 to -862 (Cure. Supp. 1975).
Other states have adopted statutes which authorize a state agency to exercise limited powers to
guide land development. States with such enactments are: Missouri, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 251.010-
.440 (Vernon Cue. Supp. 1977); Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 84-142 to -160 (Cure. Supp.
1976); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 113A-150 to -159 (1975); and Tennessee, Tenn. Code
Ann. §§ 13-101 to -109 (1973), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1976). These statutes generally limit the
state's role to that of an advisor to local governments, the governor or the legislature. Mo. Rev.
Stat. §§ 251.030(1)-(3), (5)-(6) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1977); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-156 (Cum. Supp.
1976); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-153 (1975); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 13-106, 13-108 (1973).
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of state control 5 Second, the American Law Institute has formulated a Model
Land Development Code which includes provisions for state regulation.6 The
Code has been the prototype for many statutes enacted recently.
7
This Comment reviews the land use statutes which currently authorize state
control over land development. First, the objectives of these statutes will be
considered. The powers of the state administrative agency and the function of
municipal governments under the various land control systems will then be
examined. The discussion will include an analysis of the strengths and
weaknesses of these enactments.
II. THE REASONS FOR STATE CONTROL
A. Historical Perspective
The freedom to use and enjoy private property without unwarranted
government interference is one of the most coveted rights in the Anglo-
American tradition.8 The concern for the preservation of the right to hold and
use private property was embodied in the United States Constitution which
provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without
just compensation." 9
Nonetheless, individual use of property may itself unduly interfere with the
5. Senator Henry Jackson introduced the first Congressional land use bill, S. 3354, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Its introduction was too late for Senate consideration during that session.
American Enterprise Institute, Land Use Proposals 1 (1975). A second proposal, S. 632, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) was passed by the Senate, but neither the Senate's proposal nor its
counterpart, H.R. 7211, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), was acted upon by the House. Id. at 2. The
third proposal, S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), was also passed by the Senate and sent to the
House. However, both the Senate bill and the House version, H.R. 10294, 93d Cong., 1st Seas.
(1973), again failed to reach the House floor. Id. The most recent effort of the Senate, S. 984,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), did not reach the Senate floor. The House also failed to vote upon a
similar proposal, H.R. 3510, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
While Congress has not yet enacted legislation supporting state-wide regulation, the discussion
in Congress has interested some states in state land use controls. At least one state has considered
these Congressional proposals in its preparation for state-wide land use regulations. Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 147.350(9) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
6. Al Model Land Development Code art. 7 (Proposed Official Draft 1975) [hereinafter cited
as Model Land Development Code]. This article of the Code was formulated for the purpose of
redelegating part of the state's regulatory powers from local governments to a state agency. It was
designed to allow states to select the provisions suitable to their individual purposes. Bosselman,
Raymond & Persico, Some Observations on the American Law Institute's Model Land Develop-
ment Code, 8 Urban Law. 474, 475 (1976).
7. The Model Land Development Code has affected the legislation of seven of the eleven
states which have enacted state-wide controls. See sections II A(2), 11 B(2) infra.
8. Blackstone, in his treatise on the laws of England, considered this freedom to be a basic
principle of English law: "The third absolute right.., is that of property: which consists in the
free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all... acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save
only by the laws of the land.... So great ... is the regard of the law for private property, that
[the law] will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole
community." W. Blackstone, Commentaries *138-39.
9. U.S. Const. amend. V.
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use and enjoyment of property by others. To prevent such a result, some form
of restraint is necessary. Before statutory controls were instituted, the com-
mon law of nuisance evolved to restrict the use of private property.' 0
However, nuisance actions alone are inadequate to regulate property usage
since it is often difficult for landowners to anticipate the legality of a proposed
activity. 1 Furthermore, this body of law has been predominantly concerned
with protecting property values; 12 individual developments which otherwise
have significant effects upon the community may not be controllable through
nuisance actions. 13
A second common method employed by private landowners to control
neighboring land uses is the inclusion of restrictive covenants in conveyances
of land. Reciprocal agreements between neighboring landowners not to en-
gage in particular uses or to restrict property use to specific activities are
incorporated as covenants in deeds.14 These covenants provide a substantial
degree of predictability to land use since they can bind subsequent titlehol-
ders. This method of regulation, however, does not permit the community to
control developments which may have significantly detrimental public im-
pact.
Statutory land use controls were not common in the United States until the
1920's.15 A major reason for the late exercise of public control of private
property was a concern as to the constitutionality of such restraints.' 6 It was
not until 1926 that the Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Company17 recognized such regulation to be within the police powers of the
state. The Court there held that the states have wide powers to supervise land
use where the objective is the protection of the general welfare. 18 Since
10. The law of nuisance is concerned with the protection of public and private rights which
are adversely affected by the use of private property. These rights are distinct from a proprietary
interest in the site in controversy. Disputes within the scope of this action range from petitions by
neighboring landowners to enjoin uses which reduce the productivity of their land to complaints
about uses which interfere with the quiet enjoyment of property. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts
§ 87 (4th ed. 1971).
11. Undertaking a project which later is deemed a nuisance could be financially burdensome.
Furthermore, the judicial determination that a use is a nuisance can occur even if that use
predates the neighboring use with which it is interfering. E.g., Pendoley v. Ferreira, 345 Mass.
309, 187 N.E.2d 142 (1963); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870,
309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
12. 1 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 2.03 (1968).
13. For example, activities which destroy the aesthetic character of the community may not
be subject to nuisance actions. Id. at 36.
14. Id. § 2.04. Covenants were used to protect the interest of the landowners irrespective of
the activity's effect on the community.
15. New York City adopted the first comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1916. Id. § 2.07.
16. Until the 1920's, zoning ordinances which restricted non-nuisance uses were frequently
found invalid. D. Hagman, Urban Planning and Land Development Control Law § 28, at 68
(1971).
17. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
18. Id. Not only may the state require that dangerous and offensive activities be located away
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Euclid this power has been exercised not only for economic purposes but also
for aesthetic reasons' 9 and to restrict the permissible location of legal uses. 20
While the Court in Euclid found that the authority to regulate the use of
land was vested in the state, this power historically has been delegated to
municipalities and county governments. 2' Land use was considered to be a
local activity, the effects of which were assumed to be limited to the
immediate environs of the site. 22 The local community was believed to be
better able to understand and evaluate whether a particular use at a specific
site would injure the general welfare. 23
The assumptions that the effects of land development are limited and that
the local community has superior competence to evaluate land use issues have
been subjected to increasing skepticism. The emergence of environmental
controversies and chronic problems such as the need for low-cost housing
have revealed the inadequacies of local control. 24 While most land use
activities have geographically limited effects, certain activities may have
widespread social, economic and environmental impact. In such cases, not
only the immediate community but all affected areas have an interest in the
land use decision. Furthermore, while individual developments may have
only marginal impact outside the local community, the cumulative effect on
the region or the state may be substantial. However, regional and state
interests may not be asserted because the authority to regulate has been
exclusively delegated to local governments. Finally, the ramifications of
certain land use activities may be very complex and require technical knowl-
edge for proper assessment. Local governments may not possess the resources
or information necessary to evaluate these developments effectively. 5 Even
assuming that local governments have such capability, critics have been
from other uses, but it may broadly categorize activities and separate them by zones. So long as
the state's regulations are not arbitrary the Constitution will not be offended. Id. at 388-89.
19. State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967).
20. Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (zoning regulations requiring that
pornographic theaters be separated by minimum distances are constitutional).
21. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
22. See ALI Model Land Development Code xizx-xx (Tent. Draft No. 1 1968).
23. 1 R_ Anderson, American Law of Zoning 2d § 2.03 (2d ed. 1976).
24. Four studies which criticized existing laws noted that the unrestricted grant of power to
local governments has produced a distortion in urban growth and left the state without a means
of solving regional and state-wide problems such as pollution, low-cost housing, and environmen-
tal protection. Also, delegation of the state's power has resulted in incompetent planning and "an
administrative process which runs counter to many concepts of fairness and orderly procedure."
ALI Model Land Development Code xv (Tent. Draft No. 2 1970) (discussing the conclusions of:
Building the American City- Report of the National Commission on Urban Problems (1969); New
Directions in Connecticut Planning Legislation: A Study of Connecticut Planning, Zoning and
Related Statutes, American Society of Planning Officials (1968); A Proposed Land Use Planning
and Development Law for New Jersey (1969); New York State Planning Law Revision Study,
New York State Office of Planning Coordination (1970)).
25. See Raisch, Utah Environmental Problems and Legislative Response: I1, 1973 Utah L.
Rev. 1, 22-23.
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concerned that municipalities will weigh local goals and interests above the
welfare of the state. 26 For these reasons, greater state participation in land use
control has been urged. 27
State regulation of land use, however, has been criticized as an interference
with the efficient, free market determination of the proper allocation of
land.28 Some have contended that state regulation would advance the interest
of the rural and suburban groups which frequently control state legislatures.
29
Thus, developments necessary for urban communities but detrimental to such
powerful suburban and rural interests could be prevented.
It is also predicted that such regulation will have particularly harmful
results in the housing market where new unit construction might be curtailed.
Low-income groups would suffer the greatest from the resulting housing
shortage. 30 Hence, it is argued that the purported goals of state control-
avoiding the waste of land, and utilizing land to satisfy the most pressing
needs of society3l1 -could be defeated rather than furthered by state regula-
tion. 32
B. The Objectives of State Regulation
An increasing number of states are enacting legislation which reassigns part
of the responsibility of regulating land use to a state agency.33 In general, the
expressed reasons for these statutes have been similar. The majority of the
states have asserted their principal alms to be protection of the environment,
protection of the state's natural resources, and coordination of the individual
planning activities of municipalities. 34 Other purposes which have been
asserted are protection of historical, cultural and aesthetic resources; 3S promo-
tion of land management;36 and protection of land utility and value. 3
7
26. One commentator has stated that "local governments have been most amenable to private
interests which have often been opposed to restrictions on land use and which have sought to
keep the degree of regulation to a tolerable minimum at the expense of effectiveness." Delogu,
Beyond Enabling Legislation, 20 Me. L. Rev. 1 (1968).
27. 5 N. Williams, American Land Planning Law § 160.08 (1975).
28. Siegan, Land Use Planning in America: Controlling Other People's Property Through
Covenants, Zoning, State and Federal Regulation, 5 Envt'l L. 385 (1975).
29. Id. at 393.
30. Id. at 392-93. The effects of state regulation are expected to be an increase in the cost of
housing, a reduction in the availability of low-cost and other housing, and urban sprawl. Id. at
391.
31. Id. at 388.
32. Id. at 388-94.
33. Eleven states have enacted state-wide land use statutes. See note 4 supra. Ten of these
states enacted statutes after 1970. Id.
34. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-65-102 (1973); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 380.021 (1974); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 481 (Curi. Supp. 1973); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 116G.02 (Cum. Supp.
1976); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 321.640 (1975); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 197.010 (1975).
35. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 116G.02 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
36. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 321.640 (1975).
37. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-65-102 (1973).
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An examination of the particular circumstances which influenced the
enactment of several such statutes may help to identify factors which are
contributing to the trend toward state regulation. Vermont's legislature, for
example, was concerned with restraining the state's expanding second home
industry and the proliferation of ski resorts. 38 The legislature was anxious
about both the uncontrolled growth of these industries and the commercial
and industrial expansion that they would encourage. 3 9 The particular event
which prompted legislative action was a large-scale, second-home develop-
ment which was proposed in 1968 and would have encompassed twenty
thousand acres. 40 The proposed development drew a large public protest over
potential environmental damage; the outcry led to the enactment of state
controls in 1970.41
Other states enacted state controls under similar circumstances. Maine
adopted state regulations when it discovered that no land use controls--either
municipal or state-existed in many regions of the state where recent dis-
coveries of off-shore oil posed dangers to a burgeoning tourist industry.
42
Florida passed state controls in response to public protest against two major
transportation projects which had the potential to cause serious harm to the
environment.4 3 Hawaii's land use laws were designed to protect the prime
agricultural lands of the state from urban expansion." Hence, state regulation
of land use was employed by these states to restrain commercial and industrial
expansion which could damage the ecology of the state.
In contrast, Montana adopted state regulations for the express purpose of
encouraging economic growth.4 5 The Montana statute acknowledges that
state control should restrain "urban sprawl" and preserve an ecological
balance.4 6 The central theme of its regulatory system, however, is to "curb
unnecessary governmental regulations"47 by formulating a state land use
policy which will stimulate its economy. 48 Unlike the states discussed above,
the ultimate aim of Montana is to establish a free market system, unfettered
by local or state government regulation. 49
38. Bosselman & Callies, supra note 4, at 54.
39. See id.
40. Id. at 54-55.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 187.
43. A Cross-Florida Barge Canal proposal was the immediate cause of public protest which
led to state controls. Wershow & Juergensmeyer, Agriculture and Changing Legal Concepts in an
Urbanized Society, 27 U. Fla. L. Rev. 78, 86-88 (1974). Prior to that proposal, however,
construction of a jet airport in the Florida Everglades had been suggested. Critics claimed that
the project would endanger the ecology of that area and, consequently, the state's tourist
industry. See Note, Jetport: Stimulus for Solving New Problems in Environmental Control, 23 U.
Fla. L. Rev. 376 (1971).
44. Bosselman & Callies, supra note 4, at 6.
45. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 84-7502(3) (Supp. 1975).
46. Id. § 84-7502(4).
47. Id. § 84-7502(5).
48. Id. § 84-7502.
49. Id. § 84-7503. In other respects, however, its objectives are similar to those of other
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III. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE LAND USE LAWS
While the states which have enacted state controls generally have been
motivated by similar considerations, the statutes enacted are significantly
dissimilar in many respects. In the following analysis, two aspects of state
land use laws will be examined and the various approaches will be evaluated.
First, the statutory limitations on both geographical areas and types of
development activities will be considered. Some states have granted broad
jurisdiction to the administrative agency so that all lands within the state and
most development activities are potentially subject to state control. Other
states have restricted state control so that only areas with particular charac-
teristics and activities which present problems of state-wide significance are
affected.
Second, the systems of control which are embodied in these statutes will be
compared. The features which will be discussed are: (1) the degree to which
the state directly enforces agency decisions; (2) the relationship between the
administrative agency and local governments; (3) the agency's authority
relative to other state agencies; and (4) the extent to which the administrative
agency participates in the planning of growth and development.
A. Areas and Activities Subject to State Control
The states which have enacted controls can be separated into two catego-
ries. The first category consists of those states which enacted controls before
the ALl Model Land Development Code was formulated in 1971.50 These
states provide for state-wide agency jurisdiction. The second category in-
cludes those states which enacted statutes since the introduction of the
Code.51 The latter states generally follow the Code, which limits agency
jurisdiction to selected geographical areas and development activities.
1. Pre-Code States: General Jurisdiction
Of the three pre-Code states-Vermont, Maine and Hawaii-Vermont has
adopted a statutory system which grants the broadest jurisdiction to the
administrative agency. In this state, development activities rather than geo-
graphical areas are regulated.5 2 The only activities exempt from state control
states: (1) the preservation of agricultural land, (2) control of urban sprawl, and (3) controlling
industrial and commercial growth. Id.
50. The task of formulating the Model Land Development Code was started in 1963. D.
Hagman, Urban Planning and Land Development Control Law § 32, at 72 (1971). The drafts of
several sections of the Code were completed before 1971; however, in that year the completed
draft of article 7, which provides for state involvement in land regulation, was introduced. ALI
Model Land Development Code Art. 7 (Tent. Draft No. 3 1971).
51. The states included in this category are: Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-65-101 to
65.1-502 (1973), as amended, (Supp. 1975); Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 380.012-.12 (1974), as
amended, (Cum. Supp. 1976); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 116G.01-.14 (Cum. Supp. 1976);
Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 321.640-.810 (1975); Oregon, Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 197.005-.795 (1975);
Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 63-28-I (Supp. 1975); and Wyoming, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 9-849 to -862
(Cum. Supp. 1975).
52. Activities subject to state regulation in Vermont include: (1) "construction of improve-
1160 [Vol. 45
LAND USE STATUTES
are developments involving ten acres of land or less, farming construction,
logging or forestry activities, housing projects of fewer than ten units, and
electric generation or transmission facilities.53
Vermont's administrative agency has jurisdiction over both private de-
velopment activities and municipal and state uses.54 The control of municipal
activities prevents local governments from undertaking projects which may
serve the interest of the local community to the detriment of the rest of the
state. This approach also provides a means of coordinating the state's
economic growth by controlling the land development activities of otherwise
independent local and state agencies.
Maine has enacted statutes which, like Vermont, provide for state-wide
jurisdiction. It too regulates both public and private development activities. 5
However, Maine has an additional and separate provision for state control of
lands which are currently "unorganized"--that is, not part of a chartered
municipality-or which become "deorganized" in the future. 56 Hence, both
building development and geographical areas are subject to state control.
In contrast to Maine and Vermont, Hawaii regulates only geographical
areas. In that state, control of urban districts is left to local governments5 7
while lands designated by the administrative agency as agricultural"8 or
conservation5 9 districts are subject to state regulation.
The control of geographical areas produces different results from state
control of developmental activities. State regulation of selected geographical
areas may prevent potentially detrimental activities from locating in those
areas. Such activities, however, may be pursued in non-regulated areas
although their effect may be equally onerous. Control of activities, as pro-
vided by Vermont and Maine, 60 avoids this result. Regardless of where within
ments on a tract or tracts of land, owned or controlled by a person, involving more than 10 acres
of land within a radius of five miles of any point on any involved land, for commercial, or
industrial purposes;" (2) the "construction of improvements for commercial or industrial purposes
on more than one acre of land within a municipality which has not adopted permanent zoning
and subdivision bylaws;" (3) "construction of housing projects . . . with 10 or more units,
constructed or maintained on a tract or tracts of land, owned or controlled by a person, within a
radius of five miles of any point on any involved land." Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 6001(3) (1973).
Also, improvements on property of more than ten acres for state or municipal purposes are within
the scope of the statute. Id.
53. Id. § 6001(3).
54. Id., as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1976).
55. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 482(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
56. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 681 to 685-C (1974), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1976).
57. Bosselman & Callies, supra note 4, at 8.
58. Hawaii's State Land Use Commission has jurisdiction only over agricultural districts.
This jurisdiction is shared with county governments. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 205-5(b) (1968), as
amended, (Supp. 1975).
59. The department of land and natural resources governs land uses in conservation districts.
Id. § 205-5(a).
60. Whether a development will be permitted at a proposed site is dependent, in part, upon
the characteristics of the site. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 6086 (1973), as amended, (Cum. Supp.
1976); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, 484(2)-(4) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
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the state a proposed activity is to take place, it is subject to control. Hence,
this approach provides a greater potential for consistent regulation.
On the other hand, state control of areas may be more acceptable politically
since regulation is restricted to selected localities and the average landowner is
less likely to be affected. Moreover, the broad discretion given to the
administrative agency under the Vermont and Maine statutes 6 1 places most
proposed developments in an insecure position until a permit is granted or
denied. Landowners and developers are less able to undertake preliminary
financing and scheduling. The restriction of state regulation to specific areas
places the landowner on notice of the intent of the state to limit development
in those areas and eliminates much uncertainty.
These distinctions between regulation of areas and of activities do not imply
that these are conflicting or mutually exclusive forms of regulation; rather,
they are complementary. State control of activities permits state-wide regula-
tion of developments which endanger the environment or economy. To
regulate such developments effectively through state control of areas, the
administrative agency would be forced to speculate as to all areas in which
such development could cause difficulties. Regulation of areas, however,
enables the state to identify sites which are of special concern, and, thus, to
focus agency resources where they are most needed.
2. Model Code States: Limited Jurisdiction
A second category consists of those states which have established state
jurisdiction akin to that suggested by the ALl Model Land Development
Code. 62 Under the regulatory scheme of the Code, state jurisdiction would
extend only to those areas designated by the administrative agency as areas of
critical state concern 63 and over developments which are likely to have
regional or state impact. 64 Thus, the Code incorporates state controls over
both areas and activities.
The provision for the regulation of areas of critical state concern is a major
contribution of the Code. Areas which may be classified as areas of critical
state concern are those which: (1) "significantly [are] affected by, or [have] a
significant effect upon, an existing or proposed major public facility or other
area of major public investment;' '65 (2) have a "significant impact upon
historical, natural or environmental resources of regional or statewide impor-
tance;" 66 or (3) constitute "a proposed site of a new community designated in a
State Land Development Plan. ' '67 Districts which are otherwise of economic
or social significance would not be subject to state regulation.
Activities over which the Code exercises jurisdiction are those which,
61. See notes 89-114 infra and accompanying text.
62. Model Land Development Code, supra note 6.
63. Id. § 7-201.
64. Id. § 7-301.
65. Id. § 7-201(3)(a).
66. Id. § 7-201(3)(b).
67. Id. § 7-201(3)(c).
1162 [Vol. 45
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because of their size or their effects on the surrounding environment, present
issues of regional or state-wide importance. 68 This definition permits the
agency to designate a wide range of activities as "developments of regional
impact. ' '69
Seven states have enacted legislation similar to that proposed in the Code.7 0
Most of these states have adopted statutes which provide for the regulation of
areas of critical state concern, 71 but Minnesota, Utah, Nevada, and Wyom-
ing72 have not enacted state controls over developments of regional impact. 3
Hence, in these four states, activities which present problems because of their
size can escape state controls simply by avoiding critical areas.
Of the states which have enacted critical area statutes,7 4 only Florida"s and
Minnesota7 6 have adhered to the Code. Some states have restricted the state
jurisdiction provided in the Code. For example, Nevada requires that an area
be in potential danger of "irreversible degradation" from development to be
designated as a critical zone. 77 Utah, in contrast, has expanded state jurisdic-
tion and permits critical area designation where development would have
significant consequences on economic, social or recreational activities.7 8
68. Id. § 7-301(1).
69. The factors which the administrative agency must consider in designating developments
of regional impact are: (1) traffic generation; (2) number of persons who would occupy or be
attracted to the development; (3) environmental problems; (4) size of the site; (5) likelihood of
substantial development; and (6) the unique character of an area. Id. § 7-301(2).
70. See note 51 supra.
71. Oregon's administrative agency does not regulate critical areas although it may recom-
mend that particular areas be designated as critical. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 197.405(2) (1975). The
agency regulates only activities of state-wide importance; however, Oregon patterned its statutes
after the Code. See notes 172-78 infra and accompanying text.
72. Wyoming's statutes refer only to particular development types with respect to selecting
areas of critical concern. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-850(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
73. An early draft of the Code provided for the regulation of "large-scale developments." ALI
Model Land Development Code § 7-401 (Tent. Draft No. 3 1971). The proposed official draft
modified this term to "developments of regional impact." Model Land Development Code, supra
note 6, § 7-301. However, most of the states have adopted the phrase "large-scale developments."
74. The states in this category which have enacted critical area statutes are: Colorado, Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-65.1-201 (Supp. 1975); Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 380.05 (1974); Minnesota,
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 116G.06(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 321.770 (1975);
Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 63-28-1(6) (Supp. 1975); and Wyoming, Wyo. Star. Ann. § 9-853(ix)
(Cum. Supp. 1975).
75. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 380.05(2)(a)-(2)(c) (1974), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1976). However, the
Florida statutes include endangerment of archeological resources as a basis for designating an
area to be of critical state concern. Id. § 380.05(2)(a). Florida also prohibits more than 5 per cent
of the land of the state from being designated as a critical area. Id. § 380.05(17). This restriction
has been criticized as a major weakness since it prevents any comprehensive state regulation of
development in Florida's coastal zone and inland wetlands. Comment, Area of Critical State
Concern: Its Potential for Effective Regulation, 26 U. Fla. L. Rev. 858, 871 (1974).
76. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 116G.05 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
77. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 321.660 (1975).
78. Utah Code Ann. § 63-28-1(5)(2)(e)(iv) (Supp. 1975).
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A third aspect of the Code from which several states have deviated is the
types of activities which the state administrative agency may regulate. The
Code grants the administrative agency broad discretion to determine the types
of activities, both public and private, which are within its jurisdiction. 79 In
contrast, Colorado limits agency authority to regulation of various public
service projects, highways, and new community developments."0 No private
projects other than new communities are subject to agency control.
Oregon also restricts agency jurisdiction. Its statute authorizes the adminis-
trative agency to designate an activity for state regulation if it falls into one of
three categories, all of which are of a public rather than private nature.8 1
However, the statute specifically empowers the agency to recommend to a
legislative committee that other activities, public or private, be designated by
the legislature as having state-wide significance.8 2
Florida, on the other hand, has created jurisdiction broader than that in the
Code. While the Code requires that there be effects on the surrounding
environment which are of state or regional significance, 83 Florida grants
jurisdiction over developments which have a "substantial effect upon the
health, safety, or welfare of citizens of more than one county.184 This
criterion establishes authority not only over activities which affect the envi-
ronment, but also over those which may adversely affect the economy or
social conditions.
From this review of agency jurisdiction under the various state land use
statutes, two trends are discernible. First, the Model Land Development
Code, which provides for regulation of delimited critical areas and selected
79. See notes 68-69 supra and accompanying text.
80. The Colorado Land Use Act limits the designation of activities of state interest to: "(a)
[s]ite selection and construction of major. . . extension[s] of existing domestic water and sewage
treatment systems; (b) [s]ite selection and development of solid waste disposal sites; (c) [s]lite
selection of airports; (d) [slite selection of rapid or mass transit terminals, stations, and fixed
guideways; (e) [slite selection of arterial highways and interchanges and collector highways; (J)
[s]ite selection and construction of major facilities of a public utility; (g) [slite selection and
development of new communities; (h) [e]fficient utilization of municipal and Industrial water
projects; and (i) [c]onduct of nuclear detonations." Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-6S.1-203 (1973), as
amended, (Supp. 1975).
81. Oregon authorizes the designation of activities for state control if they are related to the
planning and siting of: (1) public transportation facilities; (2) public sewage, water supply, and
solid waste disposal sites and facilities; or (3) public schools. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 197.400 (1975).
82. Id. § 197.405(1).
83. Model Land Development Code, supra note 6, § 7-301(1). The Code does provide that the
agency include in its consideration the likelihood that "additional or subsidiary development will
be generated." Id. § 7-301(2)(e). It also requires that the unique character of particular regions In
the state be considered. Id. § 7-301(2Xf). A narrow interpretation of the Code, however, suggests
that the administrative agency is more concerned with the physical impact of selected develop-
ments than with their negative social and economic effects. In contrast to the limited respon-
sibilities assigned to the agency, the Code requires that local governments, when regulating
activities designated as developments of regional impact, include in their evaluation factors which
are "indirect, intangible, or not readily quantifiable." Id. § 7-402.
84. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 380.06(1) (1974).
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developments, is the dominant prototype for future land use legislation. The
other principal paradigm is typified by Vermont, which invests the state
agency with regulatory powers over nearly all development activity in the
state. This approach has not been followed by another jurisdiction since the
Code was introduced in 1971. The majority of the states which have enacted
state land use legislation since the Code's introduction have established
jurisdiction over both critical areas and selected development activities. Of
those which do not regulate both, most have enacted critical area statutes.
This indicates that, while variations can be expected, the Code will continue
to be the primary model for future legislation.
The second identifiable pattern is a preference for greater limitations on
agency jurisdiction. Two points support this conclusion. First, the Vermont
approach, which grants wide jurisdiction, has not been followed while the
more restrictive Code scheme has gained rapid acceptance. Second, most of
the states which follow the Code have limited state jurisdiction to a greater
extent than does the Code. Unless the public demands for greater regulation
increase dramatically, it is probable that this trend will continue.
B. Systems of State Regulation of Land Use
The present state land use laws represent several types of regulatory
systems. These systems basically differ as to: (1) the extent of the administra-
tive agency's authority to enforce its regulations, and (2) the degree of state
participation in land use planning. Some systems authorize direct agency
enforcement-that is, the agency enforces its own decisions. Other systems
provide for more indirect methods of state control, requiring local govern-
ments or other state agencies to participate in enforcement.
Agency participation in land use planning is a further means by which the
state may exercise control. Land use planning is the process of determining
the most desirable use of land from a community viewpoint for the purpose
of guiding land development."5 The product of the planning process is
normally a land use map which embodies the needs and goals of the
community and specifies the uses to which land may be put.86 The principal
purposes of land use planning are to provide both a rational basis for making
land use decisions and a means of coordinating the activities of different
governmental bodies.8 7 By compelling municipal governments to formulate
ordinances and local plans which conform with state land use policies, the
state may oversee land development much more effectively.88
In the following discussion, the various states have been categorized into
four classes of systems on the basis of the degree of direct control which the
administrative agency may exert on land developments. These approaches
85. See 1 N. Williams, American Land Planning Law § 1.01, at 2 (1974).
86. Id. § 1.18.
87. Id. § 1.06.
88. Planning is especially necessary with respect to land activities which are of regional or
state import. For a discussion of the role of state and regional planning see Mandelker, The Role
of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 899, 915-18 (1976).
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will be reviewed and compared. Included in this discussion is an evaluation of
the efficacy of the prescribed degree of state participation in land use
planning.
1. Direct Control Systems
Vermont is the primary proponent of aggressive state regulation of land
use. Under Vermont's system, the administrative agency has the primary
state-wide responsibility for planning and enforcing land development regula-
tions. With respect to planning, the administrative agency must undertake
a two-step procedure. The first phase involves surveying existing uses and
formulating a capability and development plan for the state which incorpo-
rates social and economic considerations. 89 The purposes of this plan are to
guide development9" and provide a basis for subsequent state and local
plans. 91
On the basis of this capability plan, the agency must formulate a state-wide
land use plan which designates, in broad terms, the uses to which the lands
within the state may be put.9 2 The land use plan is then implemented by local
governments through subdivision regulations and zoning. 93 Thus, the agency
has paramount responsibility for planning future land uses, a task normally
delegated to local governments. 9
4
A second dimension of the agency's authority is its power to grant or deny
development permits. No development within the scope of the board's juris-
diction 95 can commence, nor any interest in a subdivision 96 be sold, without a
permit from the agency.9 7 Before a permit is issued, the agency must
determine that the developer or landowner has complied with certain re-
quirements which are designed to prevent air and water pollution, erosion,
89. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 6042 (1973).
90. To be included in the plan are an evaluation of the capability of land to support
development, an assessment of the proper uses of natural resources, a plan for public and private
capital investment, and provisions for commercial, industrial and residential development. Law
of April 23, 1973, No. 85, §§ 7(a)(1)-(4), [1973] Vt. Laws 248-50.
91. The capability and development plan may be adopted by local governments to fulfill
other statutory planning obligations under section 4302 of Title 24. Law of April 23, 1973, No.
85, § 6(a), [1973] Vt. Laws 248.
92. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 6043 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The land use plan broadly categorizes
land by function: forestry, agriculture, recreation, or urban. Id. This authority to classify
property is similar to the state planning responsibilities first provided for in Hawaii. See note 185
infra and accompanying text.
93. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 6043 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Thus, local governments have the
authority to zone land for particular urban uses such as commercial, industrial, and residential,
while the state broadly categorizes land.
94. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
95. See notes 52-54 supra and accompanying text.
96. " 'Subdivision' means a tract or tracts of land, owned or controlled by a person, which
have been partitioned or divided for the purpose of resale into 10 or more lots within a radius of
five miles from any point on any lot, and within any continuous period of 10 years [after July 1,
1973]." Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 6001(19) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
97. Id. § 6081 (1973).
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traffic congestion, and burdens on community facilities, as well as endanger-
ment of scenic or historical areas. 98 This broad power coupled with the
responsibility of planning the future growth of the state constitutes the most
active state land use control system currently in effect.
Appeals from the actions of the agency in state court may be made only by
the permit applicant, a state agency, the regional and municipal planning
commissions or the municipality in which the proposed development would
take place. 99 Hence, adjoining property owners may not appeal a permit-
issuing decision of the agency.100 The limitation on standing to appeal an
98. Id. §§ 6086(a)(1)-(8) (Cum. Supp. 1976). Section 6086(a)(8) has been criticized as being too
vague with respect to the phrase "rare and irreplaceable natural areas" to give the administrative
agency guidance. Walter, The Law of the Land. Development Legislation in Maine and
Vermont, 23 Me. L. Rev. 315, 317, 328 (1971).
Moreover, the statute raises a due process problem since it may authorize a taking of private
property without just compensation in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. U.S.
Const. amends. V, XIV. Under this section, a permit request may be denied and the property
held in an undeveloped state if it is demonstrated by any party that the development will
endanger wildlife habitats or threaten endangered species, and that public benefit from the
development does not "outweigh the economic, environmental or recreational loss to the public."
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 6086(a)(8)(A)(i) (Cum. Supp. 1976). Furthermore, when such an ecological
threat is demonstrated, a permit may be denied if the applicant owns or controls an alternative lot
which could be substituted for the site in controversy. Id. § 6086(a)(8)(A)(iii).
In the only case to challenge the constitutionality of this section, Vermont's highest court rested
its decision on other grounds and refused to consider these issues. In re Wildlife Wonderland,
Inc., 133 Vt. 507, 519-20, 346 A.2d 645, 653 (1975). However, it is generally held that for land
use regulations to be constitutionally valid, such regulations must permit some reasonable use of
land. E.g., State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher,
278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938). To prohibit any development of property would seem to
constitute a taking without compensation. For a discussion of this issue see F. Bosselman, D.
Callies & J. Banta, The Taking Issue (1973) (prepared for the Council on Environmental
Quality).
At least one state, however, has found that it is not unreasonable to restrict use of private
property to its natural uses to prevent harm to the public welfare. Just v. Marinette County, S6
Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). Maine has a similar provision which requires that the
proposed development fit "harmoniously into the existing natural environment." Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 38, § 484(3) (Cum. Supp. 1973). This clause also has been criticized as overly vague.
Walter, The Law of the Land Development Legislation in Maine and Vermont, 23 Me. L. Rev.
315, 336 (1971). However, it has been upheld as constitutional. In re Spring Valley Dev., 300
A.2d 736, 749-52 (Me. 1973).
99. Vt Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 6085(c), 6089(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
100. In re George F. Adams & Co., 134 Vt. 172, 353 A.2d 576 (1976). This restriction negates
previous court decisions which granted adjacent landowners standing to challenge the agency's
actions. In re Barker Sargent Corp., 132 Vt. 42, 313 A.2d 669 (1973).
However, a decision by the agency that a neighboring land owner may not be heard at de novo
public hearings on a permit application may be appealed in state court. In re Preseault, 130 Vt.
343, 292 A.2d 832 (1972). Standing to appeal an agency decision extends to immediately adjoining
landowners but not to non-adjoining landowners. In re Great Eastern Bldg. Co., 132 Vt. 610,
326 A.2d 152 (1974). In this case, the appellant owned property one quarter of a mile from the
proposed development site and was denied standing to be heard at the de novo hearings of the
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agency decision ensures that only substantial controversies will be adjudicated
and that the agency may act without being burdened with an overwhelming
number of appeals. 10 1
Under the Vermont scheme, the relationship between the state and local
governments is radically different from the traditional control method, which
delegated exclusive regulatory authority to local governments.' 0 2 In Vermont,
the administrative agency must consider local planning decisions when it
formulates state plans' 0 3 and evaluates permit requests.104 Local approval' 0 5
may be overriden, however, where the proposed project would have substan-
tial detrimental effects on a neighboring municipality, the region or the
state. '0 6Furthermore, where the agency has held a de novo hearing and
rendered its decision, subsequent adoption of a local plan which conflicts with
that decision is not binding on the agency.' 0 7 Local decisions, therefore, are
subordinate to the authority of the agency.
The agency's land use and capability plans also partially supersede the
authority of local governments to classify and plan land use. Once the
agency's plans are adopted, local governments must implement them.' 0 8 If a
municipality disagrees with the agency's plans, it must petition the agency for
an alteration. 0 9
agency. The court affirmed the agency's ruling since appellant was not a physically adjoining
landowner.
101. Maine allows "ra]ny person aggrieved by any order of the [agency]" to appeal. Me. Rev.
Star. Ann. tit. 38, § 487 (Cum. Supp. 1973). Recently, Maine's highest court granted standing to
a petitioner who protested the issuance of a permit on the possibility that the permit applicant's
project would pollute the air breathed by the petitioner. In re International Paper Co., 363 A.2d
235, 238-39 (Me. 1976). This broad conferment of standing potentially subjects the administrative
agency to extensive judicial review.
102. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
103. In preparing the plan, the agency must give "full account and consideration ... to duly
adopted regional plans and . . . town plans, capital programs and municipal bylaws . . . ." Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 6043 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
104. In its plans, the administrative agency must classify lands within the state Into broad
categories. Local governments must then formulate detailed plans which are consistent with those
of the agency. See notes 92-93 supra and accompanying text. When evaluating a permit request
the agency must consider these local plans. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 6046(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
105. Municipal, as well as state, permits must be obtained. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 6082
(1973). Hence, a system of duplicate permits results.
106. Id. § 6046(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
107. In re Preseault, 132 Vt. 471, 321 A.2d 65 (1974). Vermont's highest court also has held
that where a municipal permit has been issued but expires while the applicant is awaiting the
agency's approval, the municipality should not deny a renewal of the permit although zoning
changes in the interim render the project nonconforming. Preseault v. Wheel, 132 Vt. 247, 315
A.2d 244 (1974). Such occurrences reflect the problems that arise' from a duplicate permit
requirement.
108. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 6043 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
109. Id. § 6047(a) (1973). For example, land which the agency has designated for agricultural
use in its land use plan cannot be zoned by the local government for an urban use without the
approval of the agency.
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Additionally, the agency has paramount authority with respect to the land
development activities of other state agencies. It has the responsibility for
planning the growth of government facilities and public utilities; 110 land
development activities authorized by most state agencies cannot be undertaken
without a permit from the administrative agency."' 1 This centralization of
planning and regulation helps avoid conflicts between agencies, coordinates
land development activities, and ensures a consistent state land development
policy.
Maine has adopted a state land use system similar to Vermont's but with
several notable distinctions. First, Maine vests two state agencies with the
authority to control land use. The Land Use Regulatory Commission (LURC)
has the responsibility of designing and implementing plans for the develop-
ment of currently unorganized areas.1 12 The Environmental Improvement
Commission (EIC) does not participate in planning land development. It is
responsible for regulating developments which may harm the environment.' "
3
LURC and EIC have overlapping authority to the extent that a permit issued
by LURC is prima facie evidence that the proposed development satisfies the
requirements of EIC.' 14
The absence of EIC participation in land use planning suggests that un-
coordinated development may result under Maine's system. EIC's permit-
issuing decisions are made on a case-by-case basis without the guidance of a
general plan. EIC is not mandated to consider plans formulated by local
governments or other state agencies. Hence, land development may take place
in a fragmented fashion with some activities obtaining permits while other
necessary supportive developments do not. 115 Another possibility is that EIC
may consciously but unofficially formulate land use plans. If so, agency
decisions would be coordinated but neither the landowner nor the municipal-
ity could confidently plan for development without an unofficial solicitation of
EIC plans.
A second distinction between the Maine and Vermont systems of regulation
is that the authority of the administrative agency to plan for growth is
temporary in Maine while it is of indefinite duration in Vermont. LURC may
plan and regulate land development in unorganized areas as long as they
remain in that status. Upon municipal organization of these areas, the newly
formed government assumes authority to regulate development. 16 The new
110. Law of April 23, 1973, No. 85, §§ 7(a)(1)-(4), (1973] Vt. Acts 248-50 (legislative findings).
111. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 6081 (1973). Permits required by other agencies must still be
obtained. Id. § 6082. Certain developments, however, such as electric generation and transmis-
sion facilities, are not within the jurisdiction of the agency. Id. § 6001(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
112. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 683 (Cur. Supp. 1976). LURC must categorize land into
broad classes similar to those specified by Vermont. Compare id. § 685-A (1974) with Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 10, § 6043 (Cure. Supp. 1976).
113. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 484 (Cum. Supp. 1973), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1976).
114. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 685-B(I) (1974).
115. For example, a residential project may be granted a permit by EIC while a retail
shopping development which would serve that project may not.
116. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 685-A(4) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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municipal government, however, must adopt plans and regulations which are
at least as protective of natural, recreational, and historic resources as those
formulated by LURC.11 7 Local plans as well as any subsequent amendments
or revisions, must be approved by LURC. 118 Thus, while the authority to
plan directly for growth is transferred to local governments, LURC retains
indirect control over land use planning.
A third significant difference is that LURC may order the termination of
existing commercial or industrial activities which do not conform with its
plans. 1 9 The authority to compel termination of a use which is inconsistent
with rational planning or which endangers the environment is a potent means
of regulating land use which is not employed by other states. 120
The land use approaches adopted by Maine and Vermont are the strongest
systems of state control. The administrative agencies in these states have
broad powers to supervise development and to prevent endangerment of the
state's welfare. The importance of local land use decisions is minimized under
these systems as the agencies' actions may supersede local plans and decisions
if the interest of the state so dictates. Similarly, land development activities of
other state agencies are subject to regulation.
A drawback of the direct control system is the substantial erosion of the
authority of local communities over land development. A municipality in
Vermont or Maine may prevent the commencement of a project of which it
disapproves by refusing to issue a municipal permit even if the state has
granted a permit. The local community, however, has a relatively minor role
in the permit-issuing process of the administrative agency.121 It cannot ensure
that projects it supports receive state permits or favorable agency considera-
tion. Neither the agency nor its regional commissions need include represen-
tatives of the involved community12 2 even though it may be substantially
affected by the agency's decision.
Another undesirable feature of direct state control is the duplication of state
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. § 685-B(7) (1974). LURC must allow a reasonable time for the landowner to convert
to a conforming use and for the amortization of his investment. Id. This authority is not delegated
to EIC.
120. This form of regulation has been used by municipalities and upheld as constitutional.
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892
(1950); Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (2d Dist. 1954); State ex rel.
Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929).
121. In Maine and Vermont, affected municipal governments may participate in administra-
tive hearings but not in the agency's decision. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 484 (Cum. Supp.
1973), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1976); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 6085 (1973), as amended, (Cum.
Supp. 1976).
122. Maine's EIC has ten members who are appointed by the governor. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 38, § 361 (Cum. Supp. 1976). LURC's eight members also are appointed by the governor. Id.
tit. 12, § 683 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
Vermont's administrative agency has nine governor-appointed members. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10,
§ 6021 (1973). District commissions, which are subordinate to the agency, consist of three
members appointed by the governor. Id. at § 6026(b).
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and municipal permit requirements. While such duplication provides a means
by which both municipalities and the state may review the development
proposal, it burdens the landowner and needlessly increases governmental
expenditures. 123 Wasted effort could be avoided by joint hearings which
would facilitate an exchange of comments between the state and local
governments. Joint hearings would have the additional advantage of allowing
the local community to participate in the decision, thereby restoring part of its
lost authority.
Another possibility would be to hold only state agency hearings to which
the municipality would be a party. Under this alternative, however, the
municipality, which would be bound by the agency decision, would not have
an equal input into the permit-issuing decision and would again relinquish its
autonomy to the state agency.
2. Indirect State Regulatory Systems
The secondary role of local governments under the systems enacted by
Vermont and Maine is probably the principal reason why few states have
adopted such a system. Land development is still considered a local concern
and state interference is only hesitantly accepted. A politically preferable
compromise would permit exclusive local control until a clear necessity
warranted state regulation. However, activities which endanger the welfare of
the state are not always obvious. Relatively minor developments may have
cumulative effects which, without state guidance, could have significant
derimental effects outside the local community.
The ALI Model Land Development Code was structured to encourage state
control of land use while preserving much of the traditional authority of local
governments. 124 It has significantly affected the evolution of state regulation.
Under the Code, local governments have the primary responsibility for
regulating land use.12 5 However, the state administrative agency is empow-
ered to establish standards "with which certain of the more important local
decisions must comply. '126
The agency may designate specific areas as areas of critical state concern 127
and establish guidelinesiss which local governments must follow in formulat-
ing regulations respecting these areas. 129 Moreover, local regulations are not
effective until state approval is secured.1 30 If the local government fails to
123. Maine provides that the municipality may petition the agency to authorize the substitu-
tion of municipal permits for those of the agency in cases of developments involving less than 100
acres. However, the permit must be reviewed by the agency, which may deny, approve or modify
iL Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 489 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
124. Model Land Development Code, supra note 6, at 289-90.
125. Id. at 292, Drafter's Note (1).
126. Id.
127. See notes 65-67 supra and accompanying text.
128. Model Land Development Code, supra note 6, § 7-201(1).
129. Id. § 7-203(1).
130. Id. § 7-203(1)-(4). From the time an area is designated as a district of critical state
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adopt suitable regulations within a specified period of time, 131 the agency is
authorized to do so.
132
The agency may also designate particular activities as "developments of
regional impact" 133 which are to be regulated by local governments in
compliance with agency standards. 134 The agency does not actually enforce
regulations except through the state land use plan-a scheme with which local
decisions must not interfere. 13 5
The Code further provides that the agency prepare a state and regional
land use plan 136 to consist of guidelines for public and private land develop-
ments. 137 Once adopted by the state legislature, 13 the plan is to be the basis
on which local governments formulate their land use schemes. 139 Local land
use plans must be submitted to the agency for review and comment before
they are adopted. 140 If the agency determines that a municipality's plan is
inconsistent with that of the state, it may order that inconsistent elements be
given no legal significance. 14 1
Under the Code, local governments make specific land use decisions while
the state administrative agency provides guidance. The agency cannot void a
decision of local government and substitute its views on its own initiative.
Instead, the Code provides that a separate adjudicatory board be established
to review local land use decisions. 142 The agency and the review board are
separated to ensure impartial review. 143 The agency may challenge the
actions of the local government, 144 but only the board may modify or reverse
a local decision. 145 Judicial appeals from the decision of the board may be
made by parties to the board's proceedings. 146
concern until land development regulations are adopted, a moratorium is placed upon develop-
ment in those areas. Id. § 7-202.
131. The Code suggests that six months is a reasonable period of time. Id. § 7-204(1).
132. Id. The agency's regulations supersede local government ordinances.
133. See notes 68-69 supra and accompanying text.
134. Model Land Development Code, supra note 6, § 7-301.
135. Id. § 7-304(2)(b).
136. Id. §§ 8-401 to -405. In preparing the plans, the agency must give "consideration ... to
Land Development Plans of local governments" and other state agencies. Id. § 8-404. It may
prepare a plan for the state as a whole or for any region of the state. Id. at 383, Drafter's Note.
137. Id. § 8-401(1).
138. Both the governor and the legislature must approve the plan before it becomes effective.
Id. § 8-406.
139. Id. §§ 3-106(1)(a), 8-502(1).
140. Id. § 8-502(2).
141. Id. § 8-502(3). Thus, the local government could not grant a special permit based on an
element of the local development plan that has been declared inconsistent with the state plan by
the administrative agency. Id. at 407, Drafter's Note.
142. Id. § 7-501.
143. Id. at 329, Drafter's Note.
144. Id. at 307, Drafter's Note.
145. Id. § 7-503.
146. Id. § 9-103(6). Parties to the proceedings before the board may include: (1) the landowner
or permit applicant, (2) the local government, (3) owners of land within 500 feet of the proposed
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States which generally have modeled their systems of land use regulation
after the Code have omitted many of its provisions and substantially altered
others. For example, although the Code authorizes the administrative agency
independently to designate districts of critical state concern and to issue
development guidelines,14 7 in Florida the agency may not act autonomously
on these matters. Rather, it must submit recommendations to the governor
and his cabinet for their approval. 148 Minnesota also requires that the agency
submit recommendations to the governor, and in addition, demands legisla-
tive or administrative confirmation of the executive order. 149 In Utah, the
agency may designate areas of critical state concern only when local govern-
ments agree with the designation; 50 however, it may recommend that the
legislature designate other areas to that status when local governments will
not concur. 15 ' Finally, Colorado authorizes local governments instead of the
administrative agency to specify critical areas.' 52 The agency's role is to
establish the criteria to be used by local governments in classifying matters of
state concern, 153 to request that local governments designate specific areas for
state regulation,15 4 and to appeal a local government's action or refusal to
act. I s5
A major problem arises when the administrative agency may not indepen-
dently designate areas for state regulation. Upon notice of the agency's intent,
potentially affected landowners and developers can act to frustrate the
agency's purpose by securing a local permit or immediately commencing
development before the agency can effect such designation.
To prevent possible abuse, the Code provides that once the agency notifies
a local government that it is considering a locality for designation as a critical
area, local permits may not be issued.' 56 Minnesota has implicitly provided
similar controls. Once the administrative agency has commenced hearings on
whether specific areas should be recommended for state regulation, only those
activities which already had been issued a permit and developers who had
obtained "vested" rights will be immune from state control. 57
site, (4) qualifying neighborhood organizations, (5) persons who were improperly denied party
status at the board proceedings, (6) persons who in the view of the court have a significant
interest that has been damaged, and (7) parties to the administrative hearings before the local
government. Id. § 9-103(1)-(5). The administrative agency may also intervene. Id. § 8-203(1).
147. See notes 127-34 supra and accompanying text.
148. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 380.031(1), 380.05(l)(a) (1974).
149. Minn. Stat Ann. §§ 116G.06(1)(a), 116G.06(2)(a)-(c) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
150. Utah Code Ann. § 63-28-1(6) (Supp. 1975).
151. Id.
152. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-65.1-201 (Supp. 1975).
153. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-65-104(I)(b) (1973).
154. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-65.1-407(a) (Supp. 1975).
155. Id. § 24-65.1-407(c).
156. Model Land Development Code, supra note 6, § 7-202(2). Only in an emergency may a
local government issue a permit during the period after notice from the agency and before the
decision whether to designate an area as critical. Id.
157. Developments which had been authorized by the registration of subdivision plans, or
had been issued a development permit, or had commenced in detrimental reliance upon other
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Colorado has adopted a stronger approach. When the administrative
agency determines that a proposed development or activity which is in
progress "constitutes a danger of injury, loss, or damage of serious and major
proportions to the [interests of the state,]"158 it may notify the local govern-
ment of the danger. If the local government does not act, the agency may
petition the governor to intervene and authorize it to order that the activity
cease. 159 Florida and Utah have not enacted similar safeguards. 160
Another feature of the Code which several states have rejected is the
planning function of the state. Neither Florida nor Minnesota authorizes the
administrative agency to engage in any state land use planning. Colorado
authorizes its agency to formulate state land use plans 16 1 but, unlike the
Code, it does not permit the state agency to review or affect the legality of
local zoning schemes.' 62
The two remaining principal elements of the Code-state regulation of
developments of regional impact and the establishment of a separate ad-
judicatory board to which appeals from local decisions may be made-have
also been omitted or sharply modified by most of these states. With respect to
state regulation of developments of regional impact, only Colorado and Florida
authorize significant controls. 63 Florida provides for the control of such
activities in the same manner as the Code,'" but Colorado's method of
control is substantially different. In Colorado, the administrative agency may
only intervene when a current or proposed activity creates a danger to the
state. 1 65 The agency's authority is further restricted in that it may not directly
regulate such activities, but must seek the assistance of local governments or
the governor. 1
66
The Code's suggestion that a separate appellate body be established has
been adopted only by Florida, which adheres closely to the Code on this
point.167 The other states have varied provisions for appeals. Minnesota, for
example, requires that appeals be made by the administrative agency in state
authorization will be unaffected by the designation of the site as part of an area of critical
concern, provided that such registration, permit or commencement occurred before the hearings.
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 116G.13(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
158. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-65-104 (Supp. 1975).
159. Id.
160. Florida, in fact, has expressly restricted the effect of the designation of an area of critical
state concern. This restriction may encourage landowners to circumvent the statute by initiating
developments before such declaration is effected. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 380.05(15) (1974),
380.05(1)(b) (Supp. 1976).
161. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-65-104(1)(a) (1973).
162. See id. § 24-65-104(1)(b). Utah similarly restricts the authority of the administrative
agency. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-28-1 (Supp. 1976).
163. See notes 79-80 and 83-84 supra and accompanying text.
164. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 380.06 (1974), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1976).
165. See notes 158-59 supra and accompanying text.
166. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-65-104(2)(a), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
167. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 380.07 (1974).
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courts 1 while Colorado authorizes agency appeals to the governor or to the
courts. 
16 9
Many of these omissions and modifications substantially reduce the author-
ity and effectiveness of the administrative agency. In particular, designation
of critical areas by local government or the governor instead of the agency,
omission of state control of developments of regional impact, and limitations
on the agency's authority to compel local governments to comply with state
plans emasculate much of the control granted in the Code. These revisions
indicate a strong reluctance to permit state regulation of matters long en-
trusted to local communities.
While local participation in land use regulation is important, o7 0 constraints
on the authority of the administrative agency to act independently could
significantly inhibit the agency's ability to fulfill the goals established by the
legislature.1 7 1 To the extent that the administrative agency must act through
local governments or another state entity, it is less able to aggressively
assert and defend state interests. When the state's powers are so limited that
the agency essentially possesses secondary authority with limited powers of
enforcement, the effect is to continue to subjugate state interests to local
control.
3. Restricted State Control Systems
A third category of statutes is found in those states which have adopted
direct state control of land use, but which limit such control to particular
geographical areas or development activities. Currently, four states-Oregon,
Nevada, Wyoming, and Hawaii-have devised such systems.
Oregon provides for direct state regulation of projects which are designated
as activities of state-wide significance.1 7 2 These endeavors cannot be under-
taken without a permit from the administrative agency, 7 3 which may deny a
request for a permit if it determines that the proposed project does not comply
with applicable state-wide goals and guidelines.1 74 When the agency does
issue a permit it may require that the applicant comply with certain condi-
168. Minn. Stat Ann. § 116G.09(4) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
169. Colo. Rev. StaL Ann. §§ 24-65-104(2)(a) (1973), as amended, (Supp. 1975), 24-65.1-
407(c) (Supp. 1975).
170. ' Since land use decisions may have significant effects on the immediate environs, local
governments should participate in such decisions. Furthermore, the local community is generally
familiar with the proposed development site and the surrounding area. Consequently, it can
provide valuable input into the decision-making process.
171. See notes 34-49 supra and accompanying text.
172. The state administrative agency may designate certain activities which are specified by
statute as matters of state-wide importance and request that the state legislature designate other
activities to that status. See notes 81-82 supra and accompanying text.
173. Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 197.410, 197.415 (1975).
174. Id. § 197.415(5). The agency must include proposed development guidelines in its
recommendations to the legislature that an activity be designated as a matter of state-vide
concern. Id. § 197.405(1).
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tions and restrictions. 17' Thus, Oregon authorizes greater direct state control
of land use than the Code permits. Unlike Vermont and Maine, however,
which advocate state control of most activities, it limits that control to
particular types of developments. 176
With respect to state planning, the agency may review and amend the
regulations of local governments which are inconsistent with state guidelines
formulated by the agency. 177 This power is significantly greater than that
provided by the Code. 178
Oregon has also incorporated a provision for state control of districts of
critical state concern, but has not vested the agency with the authority to
regulate those areas. It may recommend that the legislature designate specific
areas as critical and suggest rules to govern those districts, 17 9 but it is not
empowered to enforce those regulations.
Nevada's scheme is similar to Oregon's. However, Nevada permits the
administrative agency to regulate critical areas rather than activities. 180 The
agency's responsibility for developments of regional impact is limited to
establishing a method for their identification. 18 ' But the planning authority of
the agency is broad. The agency may adopt a land use plan 18 2 and compel
local compliance through the courts. 183
Wyoming's statute authorizes the administrative agency to "adopt, modify,
enforce or revise rules and regulations necessary for the implementation [of
the statutes].' 84 A literal interpretation of this clause would authorize the
agency to bypass local governments in regulating critical areas. Hence,
Wyoming's system of state regulation is almost as broad as that in Vermont
and Maine.
Hawaii also delegates limited authority to directly control land use to a
state agency. The authority of the state, however, is more restricted than that
provided by Oregon, Nevada, and Wyoming. The administrative agency has
the authority to classify lands into four categories: urban, rural, agricultural,
and conservation.18 5 The authority to classify land into use districts enables
the agency to participate in the planning process. For example, in defining the
boundaries of urban districts, the agency must include not only areas which
are in urban use but also a sufficient excess to accommodate future urban
growth. 186 The state may thereby plan for and control urban expansion.
175. Id. § 197.415(6).
176. See notes 81-82 supra and accompanying text.
177. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 197.325(1) (1975).
178. See notes 133-35 supra and accompanying text.
179. Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 197.040(2)(i), 197.405(2) (1975).
180. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 321.770 (1975).
181. Id. § 321.720(8). This section implies broader agency power, but the statute grants the
agency no further authority in this area.
182. Id. § 321.770(1)(c).
183. Id. § 321.810(2).
184. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-853(ii) (Curi. Supp. 1975).
185. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 205-2 (Supp. 1975).
186. Id.
1176 [Vol. 45
LAND USE STATUTES
The agency's power to rule on specific land development proposals is,
however, restricted. Most geographical areas are regulated by county gov-
ernments. 18 7 The agency's authority is generally limited to regulating de-
velopments in agricultural districts by issuing permits. 88 Hawaii's system of
state regulation does not enable the state to intervene in local land use
decisions when developments in rural or urban districts threaten the interest
of the state. Greater controls such as those incorporated in the Code are
necessary to permit such intervention.
These systems of state regulation represent a compromise between the
state-dominated Vermont model and the Code, which favors the preservation
of local controls. The preference of these states for direct regulation of
particular geographical areas and activities suggests that while the traditional
exercise of land use regulation by local governments is respected, some form
of direct state regulation is necessary to protect state interests.
4. An Alternative Approach: Land Tax System
Montana has instituted a system which represents a unique alternative
approach to the direct and indirect land use systems which have been
discussed. Under Montana's system, the state seeks to effect regulation
through tax incentives. The administrative agency together with local gov-
ernments classify land into tax categories according to most desirable use.' 8 9
Combined with local zoning restrictions, these state-created incentives exert
financial pressures to encourage compliance. Through this system, Montana is
attempting to encourage economic growth and eventually to deregulate land
use. 190 This approach, however, does not enable the state to intervene when a
particular activity threatens an interest of the state.
IV. CONCLUSION
The trend toward state land use controls has been attributed to the
changing view of the economic and social functions that land serves in our
society. 191 Once seen only as a source of income for its owners, land has
become valued as a resource of the community, the use of which affects the
welfare of the state or region.1 92 The growth of environmental problems and
land-related social conflicts such as the controversy over suburban low-cost
housing 93 demonstrate the interrelatedness of local land use decisions and the
187. The department of land and natural resources has the authority to regulate conservation
districts while agricultural and, to a lesser extent, rural districts are under the jurisdiction of
the administrative agency. County governments also share in the regulation of rural districts
and have exclusive control or urban districts. Id. §§ 205-5 to -6 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
188. Id. § 205-4.
189. Mont. Rev. Codes §§ 84-7505(5), 84-7507 (Supp. 1975).
190. Id. § 84-7502(5).
191. Bosselman & Calies, supra note 4, at 314.
192. Id. at 315.
193. Exclusionary zoning-the adoption of local ordinances which in effect prevent the
construction of low-cost housing-has become a major issue in recent years. The Supreme Court
has recently held that such ordinances, even though racially discriminatory in effect, are
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state's interest in the outcome of such determinations.
The systems of regulation which have been devised reflect varied attitudes
toward state involvement. The crucial distinction between the statutory
systems is in the relative roles assigned to state and local governments. A few
states provide for comprehensive state planning and direct enforcement of
state regulations. Other states have allowed state regulation to be im-
plemented only through local governments. Some schemes restrict state
jurisdiction to particular geographical areas or types of development while
others permit much broader control. Generally, the trend is toward limited
but direct state regulation of geographical areas or developmental activities.
An ideal state land use system would ensure a consistent state-wide policy
while minimizing undue state intrusion into local affairs. An effective and
politically feasible method of effectuating these goals would provide joint state
and local jurisdiction over selected geographical areas and particular de-
velopmental activities. State guidelines for these areas and activities would be
devised through joint hearings. In addition, provisions for periodic review
and revision of the activities and areas subject to state control would enable
the state agency to re-examine the validity of continued state supervision and
to expand its jurisdiction if necessary. Finally, the agency would scrutinize
local land use plans as well as formulate a state-wide land use scheme. Local
governments would have primary responsibility for implementing these plans
except in areas and for activities subject to joint state and local control. While
the restricted land use systems now in effect in several states are somewhat
similar to this scheme, none of the jurisdictions with state-wide land use
controls have adopted such an approach in its entirety.
Adoption of some form of state land use controls by other states is probable.
Currently, at least three states are preparing legislation which will permit
state-wide regulation of land. 194 The growing interest in environmental
control and possible future Congressional legislation' 95 strongly suggest that
the trend toward state land use controls will continue. Of course, the varied
needs and interests of individual states will continue to engender a multiplic-
ity of approaches to the problem of state land use regulation. It is hoped that
the systems reviewed above offer several viable blueprints for future state
land use control.
Ernest J. T. Loo
constitutionally valid so long as they are not discriminatory in intent. Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct, 555 (1977). This decision may reduce the
availability of low-cost housing. There is a greater necessity now for state intervention to prevent
such a result.
194. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 147.350 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 299.11(8) (Supp. 1976); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-156(4)(e)(1)(c) (1975).
195. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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